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JUDICIAL NEGLECT OF THE STATUTORY
BASIS FOR THE ROSARIO* RULE: THE
GENESIS OF THE POSSESSION OR CONTROL
REQUIREMENT
David Blair-Loy*
INTRODUCTION
In 1961, the New York Court of Appeals, in People v
Rosario,' held that the prosecution must turn over to the defense
certain prior statements by prosecution witnesses.2 In 1979, the
New York State legislature enacted section 240.45(1)(a) of the
Criminal Procedure Law,3 which also requires production of prior
statements by prosecution witnesses. Despite significant discrep-
ancies in the language of the Rosario case and the controlling
statute, the Court of Appeals has neglected the controlling statute
in deciding a critical issue: whether a prosecutor is required to
produce statements not in the actual possession of the prosecutor's
office.
The Rosario court contemplated production only of statements
made to the "police, district attorney or grand jury."4 However, the
. People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448
(1961).
. Staff Attorney, Office of the Appellate Defender. J.D., Northwestern
University, 1994; A.B., Brown University, 1987. The opinions expressed in this
Article are those of the author alone and not necessarily those of the Office of
the Appellate Defender.
' 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1961).
2 id.
3 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.45(1)(a) (McKinney 1993).
4 9 N.Y.2d at 289, 173 N.E.2d at 882, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 450. Cf 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500 (1994) (requiring federal prosecutors "to produce any statement ... of
[a witness called by the prosecution] in the possession of the United States which
relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified"), cited in
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legislature departed somewhat from that language when it enacted
section 240.45. The statute requires the prosecution to produce
"[a]ny written or recorded statement ... made by a person whom
the prosecutor intends to call as a witness at trial, and which relates
to the subject matter of the witness's testimony."5 Unfortunately,
the Court of Appeals has not fully addressed the extent to which
the statute should be construed to expand the prosecution's
obligation to produce pretrial statements of witnesses.
Since the enactment of section 240.45, the Court of Appeals has
grappled with the scope of the prosecution's obligation. The court's
efforts have culminated in the recent announcement that "[w]hile
the statute speaks of '[a]ny written or recorded statement,' its scope
has been judicially interpreted as limited to circumstances when the
trial prosecutor actually has possession or control of requested
materials subject to the Rosario rule."6 On that basis, the court
held that prosecutors have no obligation to produce statements of
witnesses made to parole officers.7 That ruling represents the latest
in a series of decisions relying on the "possession or control" rubric
to circumscribe the prosecution's obligation to produce statements
made by or to representatives of other governmental agencies.8
The notion of "possession or control" has become central to
Rosario law without a sustained examination of its origins or
justification, if any, in the language or purposes of the controlling
statute. Whether by design or accident, the Court of Appeals has
seized on it to limit the prosecution's obligations more severely
Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d at 289, 173 N.E.2d at 882, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 450.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.45(1)(a) (emphasis added).
6 People v. Kelly, 88 N.Y.2d 248, 251-52, 666 N.E.2d 1348, 1349, 644
N.Y.S.2d 475, 476 (1996).
' See id. at 253, 666 N.E.2d at 1350, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 477, overruling
People v. Fields, 146 A.D.2d 505, 537 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1st Dep't 1989).
8 See, e.g., People v. Howard, 87 N.Y.2d 940, 941, 663 N.E.2d 1252, 1253,
641 N.Y.S.2d 222, 223 (1996) (prison disciplinary hearing transcripts); People
v. Washington, 86 N.Y.2d 189, 191, 654 N.E.2d 967, 968, 630 N.Y.S.2d 693,
694 (1995) (audiotapes made by medical examiners during autopsies); People v.
Flynn, 79 N.Y.2d 879, 882, 589 N.E.2d 383, 385, 581 N.Y.S.2d 160, 162 (1992)
(accident reports filed with Department of Motor Vehicles); People v. Fishman,
72 N.Y.2d 884, 886, 528 N.E.2d 1212, 1213, 532 N.Y.S.2d 739, 740 (1988)
(untranscribed minutes of co-defendant's guilty plea).
470
POSSESSION OR CONTROL REQUIREMENT
than the language of section 240.45(1)(a) appears to provide or the
legislature may have intended. This Article examines the origins
and evolution of the "possession or control" rule and suggests that
it cannot be justified under the language or purposes of the
governing statute. This Article then proposes an alternative
interpretation of the statute: the prosecution should have the
obligation to produce any prior written or recorded statement in the
possession of any governmental agency, state or local. Such an
interpretation is consistent with the language and purposes of the
statute and avoids the pitfalls of the current scheme.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE POSSESSION OR CONTROL RULE
Ironically, the "possession or control" rule first emerged as a
means to expand the prosecution's obligation to turn over prior
statements of witnesses. In People v Perez,9 the prosecutor
recorded and transcribed several conversations between a prose-
cution witness and members of the defendant's family concerning
an alleged attempt to bribe the witness, but failed to provide
transcripts of the conversations to the defense.' ° The Court of
Appeals held that the statements should have been produced and
rejected the argument that the prosecution's obligation should
extend only to statements made to police, prosecutors or grand
juries, as provided in Rosario." The court found the suggested
limitation "artificial" in part because "the conversations were
prompted by the prosecutor and recorded by law enforcement
personnel and were in their possession and control."' 2 The court
also saw "no reason why defense counsel should be deprived of the
opportunity to inspect a witness' prior statement ... simply
because the witness made the statement to a person who is not
involved in law enforcement or prosecution," noting that section
240.45(1)(a) "makes no such distinction."' 3
9 65 N.Y.2d 154, 480 N.E.2d 361, 490 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1985).
'0 Id. at 156, 480 N.E.2d at 362, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
" See id. at 158, 480 N.E.2d at 363-64, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 749-50.
12 Id.
" Id. at 158-59, 480 N.E.2d at 364, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
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The Perez court recognized that the statute altered the obli-
gation imposed by the court in Rosario. By requiring the pro-
duction of any written or recorded statement, the legislature
evidently intended to broaden the prosecution's obligation.
Although the Court of Appeals noted that the statements at issue in
Perez were in the "possession [or] control" of the prosecutor, the
court found it "more fundamental" that the plain language of the
statute mandated production of statements made to persons "not
involved in law enforcement or prosecution."' 4 Under Perez,
therefore, the fact that prior statements of a witness are in the
"possession or control" of the prosecutor is sufficient, but perhaps
not necessary, to trigger the prosecutor's obligation.
After Perez, however, the Court of Appeals drifted away from
that position, holding in People v Reedy 5 that the prosecution
was not required to produce a complainant's personal account of an
alleged attempted rape because "it was not in their possession or
control."' 6 Similarly, the court later held that the prosecution was
not required to produce a report made by a private security guard
to his employer because "the People did not know of the state-
ment's existence or contents, and ... the document was never in
the People's possession or control."' 7 The court pushed the
analysis even further in People v Fishman,"8 holding that the
prosecution was not required to produce untranscribed minutes of
a co-defendant's plea hearing, even though the prosecution had
actual knowledge of the statements.'9 The court stated:
The Rosario rule has no application in the circumstances
of this case, where untranscribed plea minutes of a poten-
tial prosecution witness have been ordered but not received
by the prosecution. Having had no immediate access of
"4 Id., 480 N.E.2d at 363-64, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
'" 70 N.Y.2d 826, 517 N.E.2d 1324, 523 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1987).
16 Id. at 827, 517 N.E.2d at 1325, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 439.
"7 People v. Bailey, 73 N.Y.2d 812, 813, 534 N.E.2d 28, 29, 537 N.Y.S.2d
111, 112 (1988).
"8 72 N.Y.2d 884, 528 N.E.2d 1212, 532 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1988).
'9 See id. at 885-86, 528 N.E.2d at 1212-13, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 739-40.
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their own to the statements, the People cannot be held
responsible for a failure to turn them over to defendant.2 °
In these two cases, the court elevated the "possession or control"
issue to a critical position in the Rosario analysis.
Dissenting in Fishman, Judge Titone argued that the majority's
holding was "inconsistent with the express language and spirit of
CPL 240.45(l)."2 1 Although the majority apparently took the
position that "the statute was merely a codification of the Rosario
rule," Judge Titone contended that "the language and legislative
history of CPL 240.45(l)(a) compel a contrary conclusion. ' '22
According to Judge Titone, the statute "[o]n its face" required
disclosure of the co-defendant's statement, and the legislative
history of section 240.45 "indicates that it was designed to reduce
the element of surprise, with its inherent unfairness, in criminal
trials, as well as to broaden discovery., 21 Specifically, the goal of
section 240.45 "was to expand discovery in criminal cases beyond
that provided for in Rosario.24 Although the majority relied on
the fact that the plea minutes "were not in the control of the
People," Judge Titone believed that the "determinative factor" was
"whether the statement might have been of use to the defense."25
In People v Tissois,26 the Court of Appeals identified the
question "whether the material sought is in the possession or
control of the People" as one of "certain factors ... bearing upon
the scope of the People's obligation under Rosario to produce the
20 Id. at 886, 528 N.E.2d at 1213, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 740 (citation omitted).
2 Id. (Titone, J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 887, 528 N.E.2d at 1213, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 740 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
23 Id., 528 N.E.2d at 1213, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 740-41 (Titone, J., dissenting)
(reviewing legislative history).
24 Id., 528 N.E.2d at 1213-14, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 741 (Titone, J., dissenting);
see id. at 887 n.*, 528 N.E.2d at 1214 n.*, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 741 n.* (Titone, J.,
dissenting) (reviewing legislative history).
251 Id. at 888, 528 N.E.2d at 1214, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 741 (Titone, J.,
dissenting). However, Judge Titone did not take issue with the result in People
v. Reedy, distinguishing it on the ground that unlike a complainant's personal
account, the record of the co-defendant's plea was the result of the prosecution's
active participation. Id. (Titone, J., dissenting).
26 72 N.Y.2d 75, 526 N.E.2d 1086, 531 N.Y.S.2d 228 (1988).
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pretrial statements of prosecution witnesses."27 In lissois, the
defendant sought disclosure of statements made by the com-
plainants to a registered social worker. The court held that the
statements were not subject to disclosure because they were
privileged by statute," and in any event were not in the posses-
sion or control of the prosecution.29
The Court of Appeals summarized its approach in People v
Flynn,3" in which the defendant moved for disclosure of a "motor
vehicle accident report filed by the complainant with the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles."'" The court stated:
We have consistently held that the People's Rosario
obligation to produce the pretrial statements of prosecution
witnesses is limited to material which is within their
possession or control. Material in the possession of a State
administrative agency, such as the Department of Motor
Vehicles, is not within the control of a local prosecutor;
thus the court properly denied defendant's request. 32
In Flynn, the court first extended the "possession or control"
rationale to include materials in the possession of a governmental
agency, rather than a private person.
The court refined its analysis somewhat in People v
Washington,33 synthesizing the "possession or control" cases with
cases holding that the prosecution is required to turn over materials
in the possession of the police. 34 According to the court, state-
ments must be produced if they are in the "actual possession of a
law enforcement agency" or if they are "in the 'control' of
27 Id. at 78, 526 N.E.2d at 1087, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 229.
28 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4508 (McKinney 1992).
29 See Tissois, 72 N.Y.2d at 77-78, 526 N.E.2d at 1086-87, 531 N.Y.S.2d at
228-29.
30 79 N.Y.2d 879, 589 N.E.2d 383, 581 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1992).
", Id. at 882, 589 N.E.2d at 385, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 162.
32 Id. (citations omitted).
13 86 N.Y.2d 189, 654 N.E.2d 967, 630 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1995).
14 Id. at 192, 654 N.E.2d at 968, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 694. See, e.g., People v.
Martinez, 71 N.Y.2d 937, 524 N.E.2d 134, 528 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1988); People v.
Novoa, 70 N.Y.2d 490, 517 N.E.2d 219, 522 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1987); People v.
Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56, 503 N.E.2d 1011, 511 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1986).
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the People."" The court then held that the prosecution was not
required to produce a copy of an audiotape made by a medical
examiner during the course of an autopsy, finding that "the duties
of [the medical examiner's office] are, by law, independent of and
not subject to the control of the office of the prosecutor, and...
[the medical examiner's office] is not a law enforcement
agency."36 The court therefore held that a disclosure "obligation
simply does not arise where, as here, the People lack control over
the items in question and the entity in possession of them is not a
law enforcement agency.,
37
After Washington, therefore, the only statements that must be
produced are those actually "in or subject to the possession or
control of the particular prosecution office" or "in the actual
possession of what is primarily a law enforcement agency., 38 For
that reason, the Court of Appeals subsequently held that the
prosecution is not required to produce statements made by
witnesses at a prison disciplinary proceeding held by the Depart-
ment of Correctional Services. According to the court, that
department "has no duty to share such material" with the prose-
cutor's office and in most respects is "an administrative rather than
a law enforcement agency. 39
Similarly, the court in People v Kelly40 noted that "records of
the State Division of Parole should not generally be deemed to be
in the control of 62 county prosecutors, nor of any other prose-
cutorial office subject to the Rosario rule."41 Moreover, the court
deemed the Division of Parole an "administrative" rather than a
"law enforcement" agency, despite the "incidental law enforcement
functions that parole officers are authorized to perform. 42
11 Washington, 86 N.Y.2d at 192, 654 N.E.2d at 968, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 694.
36 Id., 654 N.E.2d at 969, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
37 Id. at 193, 654 N.E.2d at 969, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
38 People v. Kelly, 88 N.Y.2d 248, 252, 666 N.E.2d 1348, 1350, 644
N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (1996).
39 People v. Howard, 87 N.Y.2d 940, 941, 663 N.E.2d 1252, 1253, 641
N.Y.S.2d 222, 223 (1996).
40 Kelly, 88 N.Y.2d 248, 666 N.E.2d 1348, 644 N.Y.S.2d 475.
41 Id. at 252, 666 N.E.2d at 1350, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
42 Id. (noting N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 2.10(23) (McKinney 1992); 9 N.Y.
COMP. CODEs R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8004.2 (1996)).
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According to the court, such agencies "do not represent 'The
People' in the distinctive and customary usage of that term for
prosecutorial purposes."43
In the cases following Perez and culminating in Kelly, the Court
of Appeals transformed the "possession or control" requirement
from a sufficient to a necessary predicate for triggering the
prosecution's duty to produce prior statements. To reconcile the
"possession or control" requirement with the long standing rule that
statements taken by the police must be disclosed, the court
engrafted the alternative requirement that statements in the
possession of what is primarily a law enforcement agency must also
be produced. In Kelly, the Court of Appeals stated for the first time
that the "possession or control" and law enforcement agency rubrics
constitute a "judicial interpretation" of the controlling statute.44
II. INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS OF THE POSSESSION OR
CONTROL RULE
The line of cases culminating in Kelly reveals that the Court of
Appeals has little interest in significantly expanding the scope of
the prosecution's obligation to produce statements beyond the limits
expressed in Rosario. The court has therefore construed section
240.45(1)(a) as coterminous with the rule announced in Rosario,
with one exception. Under the court's reading of the statute, the
only statements the prosecution must produce are those made to the
police, the district attorney's office or the grand jury-as in
Rosario-or other statements that happen to be in the actual
possession of the police or district attorney's office. The reasoning
behind that result, however, is suspect and cannot necessarily be
reconciled with the language or purposes of the controlling statute.
Initially, section 240.45(l)(a) did not merely "codif[y] ' '45 the
holding in Rosario. The Court of Appeals has recognized in other
41 Id. at 253, 666 N.E.2d at 1350, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
44 Id. at 251-52, 666 N.E.2d at 1349, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 476 (referring to N.Y.
CRiM. PROC. LAW § 240.45(1)(a)).
4 id. at 251, 666 N.E.2d at 1349, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 476; People v.
Washington, 86 N.Y.2d 189, 191, 654 N.E.2d 967, 968, 630 N.Y.S.2d 693, 694
(1995).
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contexts that the statute modified the prosecution's obligations. For
example, although Rosario required disclosure of prior statements
"only after direct examination" of the witness, 46 the statute
"requires that disclosure be made before the prosecutor's opening
address in a jury trial and 'before submission of evidence' in a
nonjury trial."'47 The court has never advanced any reason why the
statutory definition of what must be produced should parallel that
of Rosario, when in other respects the statute departs from the
requirements of Rosario.
More importantly, the court has never explained why the statute
requires production of statements in the possession of the police
department but not those in the possession of other agencies.
In People v Ranghelle,48 where the police failed to provide a
complaint report to the prosecution, the court rejected "the People's
argument that the Rosario rule should not be applied where the
prior statement of the prosecution witness is not in the sole custody
of the People . . . ."' As the court stated:
Where, as here, the existence of a complaint report filed
with a police precinct is readily ascertainable by the
prosecutor, there is no reason to dilute the Rosario obli-
gation by holding that defense counsel should have himself
subpoenaed the document. As we observed in Rosario,
"'the State has no interest in interposing any obstacle to the
disclosure of the facts"', and society's interest in maintain-
ing criminal trials as truth-finding processes requires that
the burden of locating and producing prior statements of
complaining witnesses, filed with police agencies, remain
solely with the People.5'
The court has never suggested any reason why this rationale should
not be extended to materials outside the possession of the police,
46 People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 290, 173 N.E.2d 881, 883, 213
N.Y.S.2d 448, 451 (1961).
47 People v. Perez, 65 N.Y.2d 154, 159, 480 N.E.2d 361, 364, 490 N.Y.S.2d
747, 750 (1985) (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.45(1)).
4' 69 N.Y.2d 56, 503 N.E.2d 1011, 511 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1986).
49 Id. at 64, 503 N.E.2d at 1016, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
'o Id. (emphasis added).
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the existence of which is also "readily ascertainable" by the
prosecution.
In reality, the prosecution exercises no more control over
documents in police hands than it does over documents in the
hands of other agencies. Like the Department of Correctional
Services in People v Howard,51 and the Division of Parole in
People v Kelly, the police have no legal obligation to share
information with the district attorney's office. Instead, police
reports and other documents "are ordinarily made available to the
People only by virtue of custom, practice and internal rules."52 In
fact, it is not unknown for the police to fail to turn documents over
to the district attorney's office, either by mistake in an individual
case or as a matter of course in a series of cases.53 Therefore, the
police cannot be "considered to be peculiarly within the prose-
cutor's control,"54 and the prosecution has no more "immediate
access"55 to police documents than it does to documents held by
other agencies.
To say that the prosecution is required to produce only those
materials held by "law enforcement" agencies is to beg the
question. The police themselves play a multi-faceted role and
perform multiple and complex tasks unrelated to law enforcement.
Among other duties, the police are charged with "the maintenance
of order, the control of pedestrian and vehicular traffic, the
mediation of domestic and other noncriminal conflicts and
87 N.Y.2d 940, 663 N.E.2d 1252, 641 N.Y.S.2d 222 (1996).
52 People v. Washington, 86 N.Y.2d 189, 195, 654 N.E.2d 967, 970, 630
N.Y.S.2d 693, 696 (1995) (Titone, J., dissenting).
" See, e.g., People v. Young, 79 N.Y.2d 365, 368 n.*, 591 N.E.2d 1163,
1165 n.*, 582 N.Y.S.2d 977, 979 n.* (1992) (noting that document not turned
over to defendant "was one of many similar reports that had been generated by
the Police Department but had never been disclosed to the trial assistants
assigned to prosecute the cases").
" People v. Fields, 146 A.D.2d 505, 513, 537 N.Y.S.2d 157, 163 (lst Dep't
1989) (Sullivan, J., concurring), overruled by People v. Kelly, 88 N.Y.2d 248,
666 N.E.2d 1348, 644 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1996).
" People v. Fishman, 72 N.Y.2d 884, 886, 528 N.E.2d 1212, 1213, 532
N.Y.S.2d 739, 740 (1988).
478
POSSESSION OR CONTROL REQUIREMENT
supplying emergency help and assistance."56 As the Court of
Appeals has said, "To consider the actions of the police solely in
terms of arrest and criminal process is an unnecessary distortion.
We must take cognizance of the fact that well over 50% of police
work is spent in pursuits unrelated to crime."57
The distinction between "law enforcement" and "administrative"
agencies is therefore artificial. The Court of Appeals has never
defined what is "primarily" a law enforcement agency as opposed
to what is "primarily" an administrative agency, and its approach
in practice seems little more than arbitrary. Whether an agency's
administrative functions are primary and its law enforcement
functions "incidental, ' 8 or vice versa, appears to be purely in the
eye of the beholder. The distinction between "law enforcement"
and "administrative" agencies is therefore untenable as a matter of
both theory and practice, as aptly demonstrated by Judge Titone's
dissent in Washington.59
In Flynn, the Court of Appeals seemed to suggest that a local
prosecutor should be excused from producing statements in the
hands of state agencies because state and local governments are
entirely separate entities. However, the distinction between state
and local government, at least for law enforcement purposes, is
fluid at best. Although district attorneys may be elected by the
people of their particular counties, they enforce the law in the name
of the state as a whole, not merely their local constituents.
Moreover, the state government shares responsibility for law
enforcement with district attorneys, as manifested in section 63 of
the Executive Law, which authorizes the governor to order the
56 People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 218, 352 N.E.2d 562, 568, 386
N.Y.S.2d 375, 381 (1976).
17 Id. The same could be said of the fire department, although it has been
held that the notes of an investigating fire marshal are nonetheless Rosario
material. See People v. Schoolfield, 196 A.D.2d 111, 118, 608 N.Y.S.2d 413,
418 (1st Dep't 1994).
" See Kelly, 88 N.Y.2d at 252, 666 N.E.2d at 1350, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
'9 See People v. Washington, 86 N.Y.2d 189, 195-96, 654 N.E.2d 967, 970-
71, 630 N.Y.S.2d 693, 696-97 (1995) (Titone, J., dissenting). See also Fields,
146 A.D.2d at 509, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 160 (discussing why Division of Parole
should be considered a law enforcement agency despite its administrative
functions).
479
JOURNAL OF LA W AND POLICY
attorney general to appear in the place of any district attorney."
Moreover, even absent an executive order, the attorney general may
"assist" in a local prosecution as long as the district attorney
"retain[s] the ultimate prosecutorial authority" in the matter." For
these reasons, local prosecutors must be considered representatives
of the state, and state and local governments cannot be considered
entirely separate for law enforcement purposes.
Ultimately, the reasoning behind the Court of Appeals'
construction of the scope of the prosecution's obligation to produce
statements collapses under the weight of its own contradictions.
The court has never explained why police documents must be
produced while documents of other governmental agencies need not
be produced. The distinctions between "law enforcement" and
"administrative" agencies and state and local government are
unsustainable in theory or practice. More fundamentally, the statute
does not support the position that only documents possessed by
"law enforcement" agencies or "local" prosecutors must be
produced. As a result, the court's decisions on the scope of the
prosecution's Rosario obligation cannot be supported as a matter of
either logic, reason or statutory construction.
III. BEYOND "POSSESSION OR CONTROL": A NEW RULE AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS
Because section 240.45(l)(a) requires the production of "[a]ny
written or recorded statement" by a prosecution witness, 62 it seems
likely that the legislature meant to broaden the scope of the
60 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(2) (McKinney 1993) (stating that when
directed by governor, attorney general shall appear before "any term of the
supreme court or . . . the grand jury thereof for the purpose of managing or
conducting in such court or before such jury criminal actions or proceedings as
shall be specified" by the governor). An attorney general exercising that power
"steps into the shoes of the local District Attorney." In re Carey, 68 A.D.2d 220,
224, 416 N.Y.S.2d 904, 907 (4th Dep't 1979). In addition, the attorney general
may prosecute any criminal violation of an anti-discrimination law that the
district attorney cannot effectively prosecute or has erroneously failed to
prosecute. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(10).
61 In re Haggerty, No. 13, 1997 N.Y. LEXIS 102, at *7 (Feb. 6, 1997).
62 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.45(1)(a).
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prosecution's obligation to produce statements. This Article seeks
to propose a reasonable construction of the statutory language that
is consistent with the stated purposes of the Rosario rule and
justifiable in both theory and practice. Given the legislature's
evident intent to expand the prosecution's obligation, it seems
reasonable to require the prosecution to produce any non-privileged
statements in the possession of any state or local governmental
agency, not merely those in the possession of the police.63
As an initial matter, it is doubtful that the statutory language
should be taken literally, since the legislature most likely did not
intend to require the prosecution to produce statements that are held
by private persons or agencies and that the prosecution had no role
in creating. For that reason, People v Reedy represents a reasonable
interpretation of the statute.64 However, it is not self-evident that
the statute should otherwise be construed as narrowly as the court
has suggested.
Many state and local agencies other than the police are charged
with gathering information and may refer matters to a state or local
prosecutor's office for criminal prosecution. At the state level such
agencies include, for example, the Department of Motor Vehicles,
the Department of Environmental Protection, the Department of
Correctional Services and the Division of Parole. At the local level,
such agencies can include the medical examiner's office and
various housing, health and safety inspectors, among others. All of
these agencies collect information relevant to criminal prosecutions.
While they may not have a "duty" to share such information, 61 it
63 This proposed rule does not strictly apply to statements in the possession
of court reporters, which were the subject of the ruling in People v. Fishman,
because court reporters are not employees of the court. However, such statements
could be considered Rosario material under the alternative rationale that the
prosecution was an "active participant" in creating the statements and should
therefore be charged with actual knowledge of their existence. See People v.
Fishman, 72 N.Y.2d 884, 888, 528 N.E.2d 1212, 1214, 532 N.Y.S.2d 739, 741
(1988) (Titone, J., dissenting).
64 70 N.Y.2d 826, 517 N.E.2d 1324, 523 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1987).
65 Compare People v. Washington, 86 N.Y.2d 189, 195, 654 N.E.2d 967,
970, 630 N.Y.S.2d 693, 696 (1995) (Titone, J., dissenting) (stating that the New
York City Charter requires the medical examiner's office to "promptly deliver"
records to district attorney's office in cases of death involving criminality) with
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is unlikely that they would refuse to provide information requested
by the police or a district attorney's office.
Indeed, People v Howard66 arose out of a murder committed
in a prison, and the transcript of the disciplinary proceedings that
the defendant sought "involv[ed] the same incident" for which the
defendant was tried.67 Evidently, the case was prosecuted because
the Department of Correctional Services informed the police or
district attorney's office of the incident. In practice, therefore, it
appears that state and local agencies cooperate with prosecutors
even though they may have no legal duty to do so, just as the
police routinely cooperate with prosecutors, even in the absence of
a legal duty to do so.
According to the Court of Appeals, the purpose of producing
the prior statements of prosecution witnesses is to remove "any
obstacle to the disclosure of the facts" and to promote the truth-
seeking function of criminal trials.68 That interest would be well
served, at a relatively low cost, by requiring the prosecution to
produce prior statements made by or to the representatives of any
state or local governmental agency. While it has long been held
that "[k]nowledge on the part of the police department would, of
course, be imputed to the District Attorney's office, 69 there is
little reason not to extend that principle to other governmental
agencies for purposes of Rosario analysis.
First, as the legal representative of the people, the prosecutor's
office should be charged with knowing which agencies are required
or authorized under state or local law to gather information about
a particular occurrence. In many cases, it is self-evident which
People v. Howard, 87 N.Y.2d 940, 941, 663 N.E.2d 1252, 1253, 641 N.Y.S.2d
222, 223 (1996) (stating that the Department of Correctional Services has "no
duty" to share information with District Attorney).
66 209 A.D.2d 1014, 619 N.Y.S.2d 993 (4th Dep't 1994), affd, 87 N.Y.2d
940, 663 N.E.2d 1252, 641 N.Y.S.2d 222 (1996).
67 Id. at 1014, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
6 People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 290, 173 N.E.2d 881, 883, 213
N.Y.S.2d 448, 451 (1961) (quoting People v. Walsh, 262 N.Y. 140, 150, 186
N.E. 422, 425 (1933) and People v. Davis, 18 N.W. 362, 363 (1884)).
69 People v. Spruill, 47 N.Y.2d 869, 871, 392 N.E.2d 1252, 1253, 419
N.Y.S.2d 69, 70 (1979) (quoting People v. McLaurin, 38 N.Y.2d 123, 126, 341
N.E.2d 250, 252, 378 N.Y.S.2d 692, 694 (1975)).
482
POSSESSION OR CONTROL REQUIREMENT
agencies other than the police are collecting information. For
example, the medical examiner's office must "perform an autopsy
in cases where a homicide is being investigated,"7 and motorists
must file accident reports with the Department of Motor
Vehicles.7" Second, the existence of such statements is as "readily
ascertainable 7 2 to a prosecutor as is the existence of statements
made to the police. Absent a statutory privilege, there is no reason
to presume that state and local agencies would be any less
cooperative than the police in providing documents requested by a
prosecutor's office.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the current scheme
frustrates the truth-seeking function of the Rosario rule and
promotes strategic behavior. The present system encourages
prosecutors not to obtain statements held by agencies other than the
police, even if such statements might assist in the search for truth.
Once such statements are obtained they must be turned over to the
defense, resulting in a strategic disadvantage for the prosecution. As
a result, prosecutors have a strong incentive to rely only on
information gathered by the police as well as a corollary disincen-
tive to seek out statements in the hands of other agencies. The
present scheme therefore encourages the gamesmanship that the
statute was designed to reduce at the expense of the fairness the
statute was designed to promote. By contrast, a rule requiring the
prosecution to produce non-privileged statements of witnesses held
by any governmental agency would enhance the fairness and
reliability of criminal trials and discourage strategic behavior at
relatively minimal cost to the prosecution.
It is no answer to suggest that materials held by state or local
governmental agencies are not within the "control" of a local
prosecutor's office.73 If "control" over documents by the
70 Washington, 86 N.Y.2d at 192, 654 N.E.2d at 969, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
71 See People v. Flynn, 79 N.Y.2d 879, 882, 589 N.E.2d 383, 385, 581
N.Y.S.2d 160, 162 (1992).
72 People v. Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56, 64, 503 N.E.2d 1011, 1016, 511
N.Y.S.2d 580, 585 (1986).
" See People v. Kelly, 88 N.Y.2d 248, 252, 666 N.E.2d 1348, 1350, 644
N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (1996); Flynn, 79 N.Y.2d at 882, 589 N.E.2d at 385, 581
N.Y.S.2d at 162.
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prosecutor's office is the touchstone, then the prosecution should
not be required to turn over any materials not in its actual posses-
sion, including statements held by the police, a position the Court
of Appeals has consistently rejected. Instead, the critical factor
should be whether the existence of the statements in question is
"readily ascertainable by the prosecutor,"74 whether or not the
statements are in the hands of the police.75 As demonstrated, the
prosecution can obtain such statements from any state or local
agency as easily as it can from the police, subject only to the
existence of a statutory privilege.
Likewise, it is irrelevant that the defense could, in theory,
subpoena or otherwise obtain such documents. 76 The Court of
Appeals has already recognized in the context of police documents
that the defense's theoretical ability to obtain a statement is
irrelevant to the prosecution's obligation to produce the statement,
as long as the existence of the statement is "readily ascertainable by
the prosecut[ion]. 77 The same reasoning applies to statements in
the possession of other state and local agencies. Moreover, since the
state is putting the defendant on trial, it is not unreasonable to place
the burden of production on the state. As a practical matter,
prosecutors are more likely than defense lawyers to obtain
cooperation from state and local agencies, and the search costs of
7" Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d at 64, 503 N.E.2d at 1016, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
See People v. Haupt, 71 N.Y.2d 929, 930, 524 N.E.2d 129, 130, 528 N.Y.S.2d
808, 809 (1988) (suggesting that the relevant factor is whether statements were
in prosecution's "possession or within their power to produce") (emphasis
added).
71 Cf United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 971 (3d Cir. 1991). The
court stated that in a Brady case, "non-disclosure is inexcusable where the
prosecution has not sought out information readily available to it . . . . [T]he
availability of information is not measured in terms of whether the information
is easy or difficult to obtain but by whether the information is in the possession
of some arm of the state." Id.; see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
76 See People v. Fields, 146 A.D.2d 505, 514, 537 N.Y.S.2d 157, 163 (1st
Dep't 1989) (Sullivan, J., concurring) (stating that defendants subject to
revocation of parole are entitled to access to Division of Parole files).
77 See Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d at 64, 503 N.E.2d at 1016, 511 N.Y.S.2d at
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obtaining information from such agencies can be prohibitive for
indigent or near-indigent defendants.
Finally, the practical costs of the proposed rule do not neces-
sarily outweigh its benefits in fairness and enhanced truth-seeking.
Admittedly, it would impose an additional burden on the prose-
cution to require it to produce statements held by agencies other
than the police. However, such a duty would be imposed only in
those cases involving other governmental agencies. Many of those
cases would require little more effort than is required to contact the
appropriate police officers in a given case. For example, the police
routinely notify the relevant parole officer when a parolee is
arrested, and the arresting officer, who typically testifies at trial,
often gives a statement to the parole officer. By obtaining a
defendant's criminal history, as is done as a matter of course for
impeachment and sentencing purposes, a prosecutor can see that the
defendant was on parole at the time of the arrest and contact the
parole officer, who can forward all appropriate materials to the
prosecutor."8 The administrative costs of such investigation are
therefore not excessive compared to the benefits in terms of
fairness and truth-seeking, especially when the prosecution
"apparently has frequent contact" with other agencies.79
However, a consideration irrelevant to the merits of the
possession or control rule may have prevented the Court of Appeals
from adopting the rule proposed in this Article, or even from
expanding the definition of what is a law enforcement agency.
Because a failure to comply with the obligation to produce prior
statements usually requires reversal per se,8° any slip by the
" In fact, this is precisely what occurred in People v. Fields, where the
prosecutor "specifically requested the parole officer to send him whatever notes
she might have made in interviewing witnesses intended to be called at
defendant's bail revocation hearing." 146 A.D.2d at 509, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 160.
79 id.
80 See, e.g., People v. Banch, 80 N.Y.2d 610, 618, 608 N.E.2d 1069, 1073-
74, 593 N.Y.S.2d 491, 495-96 (1992); People v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 547, 550-51,
517 N.E.2d 865, 867, 523 N.Y.S.2d 53, 55 (1987). The Court of Appeals has
recognized only three exceptions to the rule of per se reversal. First, when a
defendant has exhausted the direct appeal process and pursues a Rosario claim
in a collateral motion pursuant to section 440.10 of the New York Criminal
Procedure Law, the defendant "must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the
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prosecution, however inadvertent, often carries the high cost of
reversal and retrial. In addition, the prosecution might be held
hostage by an agency's failure to comply with a request for
documents, either deliberately or because of incompetence. In such
a case, the prosecution might be forced to choose between going to
trial without Rosario material, risking ultimate mistrial or reversal,
or running the risk of dismissal for failure to be ready for trial
within the required time."1 Therefore, the broader the scope of the
prosecution's obligation, the more likely it is that a defendant's
conviction must be reversed and the defendant retried. Fear of such
a scenario may be the unspoken factor driving the Court of
Appeals' decisions on the scope of the prosecution's obligation to
produce documents. Whether or not such a fear represents a valid
reason to re-examine the rule of per se reversal, it is not a valid
reason to maintain a possession or control rule that is unsupported
by the controlling statute and bedeviled by its own internal
contradictions.
CONCLUSION
Once it has been established that the defense is entitled to
production of certain prior statements, the question becomes which
failure to disclose the Rosario material contributed to the verdict." People v.
Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d 638, 649, 585 N.E.2d 795, 802, 578 N.Y.S.2d 483, 490
(1991); see N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10 (McKinney 1994). Second, when
Rosario material has been lost or destroyed, the trial court has discretion to
determine an appropriate sanction, which should include dismissal only in
extreme cases. Banch, 80 N.Y.2d at 616, 608 N.E.2d at 1072, 593 N.Y.S.2d at
494 (citing cases). Third, reversal per se is not required when the withheld
material is the "duplicative equivalent" of material that was disclosed. People v.
Consolazio, 40 N.Y.2d 446, 454, 354 N.E.2d 801, 806, 387 N.Y.S.2d 62, 66
(1976). In addition, a delay in producing Rosario material, as opposed to a
complete failure to produce, does not require reversal unless the defendant was
substantially prejudiced. Banch, 80 N.Y.2d at 617, 608 N.E.2d at 1073, 593
N.Y.S.2d at 495 (citing cases).
S See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1997)
(requiring the prosecution to be ready for trial of felony within six months of
filing of accusatory instrument, not counting time excludable for various reasons,
except in certain homicide cases and other specified circumstances).
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statements must be produced. Aside from generalities concerning
the search for truth and complete disclosure of facts, the function
of a rule governing the scope of the obligation to produce is to
allocate the risk of non-production of statements. Such an allocation
should ultimately rest on a balancing of the various interests
involved in a criminal prosecution, promoting efficiency while
recognizing the fundamental interest in fairness to defendants.
Influenced by federal law, the Court of Appeals in Rosario
assigned the risk of non-production to the defense for all statements
except those made to the police, the district attorney or the grand
jury. By requiring production of any prior written or recorded
statements, the legislature appeared to shift some of the risk of non-
production onto the prosecution, although the legislature probably
did not intend to impose an absolute requirement to produce all
prior statements of witnesses made to anyone under any circum-
stances.
In People v Perez, the Court of Appeals began to explore a
reallocation of the risk of non-production based on the plain
language of the statute, suggesting that a defendant is no less
entitled to production of a statement simply because it was not
made to a prosecutor or law enforcement agent. 82 However, in the
cases that followed, the court neglected the statute and analyzed
Rosario issues in essentially a common-law fashion, transforming
the possession or control requirement from a sufficient to a
necessary predicate for the duty to produce prior statements. Like
many common-law analyses, the court's decisions often seem fact-
driven and result-oriented rather than based on a sustained
exposition of the relevant principles. When subjected to close
analysis, the court's construction of the scope of the obligation to
produce cannot be sustained, and in fact encourages precisely the
kind of strategic behavior the statute was designed to prevent.
Over the last ten years, the Court of Appeals has insisted that
the risk of non-production of almost all statements not covered by
the original Rosario rule must remain with the defense. In contrast,
the court has maintained its allegiance to the per se reversal rule,
82 65 N.Y.2d 154, 158-59, 480 N.E.2d 361, 364, 490 N.Y.S.2d 747, 750
(1985).
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which has been criticized as needlessly technical and inconsistent
with the statutory demand to "determine an appeal without regard
to technical errors or defects which do not affect the substantial
rights of the parties."83 Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals has
apparently made a policy judgment that the competing interests in
criminal prosecutions are best served by imposing a per se reversal
rule, while at the same time restricting the scope of the prosecu-
tion's obligation to produce. However, neither aspect of that
judgment is necessarily mandated or supported by the governing
statute. Such a balancing of interests, wise or not, should not be
struck by the courts.
83 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.05(1) (McKinney 1994). See Jones, 70
N.Y.2d at 554-57, 517 N.E.2d at 870-71, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 57-59 (Bellacosa, J.,
concurring).
